SUV Accident Lawyers

SUV Accidents

Accident statistics show that there are hundreds of SUV accidents in the United States every day. Often, these accidents result in rollovers caused by the poor stability inherent in the design of many SUV's.

Why do SUV's roll over?

SUV's are among the most popular vehicles in America, however, many SUVs pose a huge risk of rolling over in an accident. Because of their high center of gravity, sport utility vehicles are more prone to rolling over. Fatality statistics show rollovers are the leading cause of death in highway auto accidents. These same statistics show that 62% of all SUV deaths occur in rollovers.

mini Suvs,vans and light trucks are among the most popular vehicles in America, they are also the riskiest when it comes to rollover accidents. But, critics say the auto industry has hidden that danger from consumers to protect profits. Because they sit higher off the road (high center of gravity) than cars, sport utility vehicles are far more prone to rollovers?the leading cause of death on America's highways.

In addition, government rollover tests show that even the most stable SUV is more likely to rollover than the least stable car. Congress has recently produced a Rollover Resistance Rating Sytstem. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration last Spring was prepared to include rollover risk on its safety Web site, but automakers complained the ratings would not be accurate. Many SUVs, they argued, have been redesigned for stability; others have added side air bags. And the fact is, many rollovers are caused by negligent drivers.

"There are other factors related to the environment, the vehicle and the human factor, all of which contribute to the rollover potential," says Josephine Cooper of the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers. While rollovers do not occur as frequently as other types of crashes, when they do occur, the result is often serious injury or death. Rollovers accounted for more than 10,000 fatalities in the United States in 1999, more than side and rear crashes combined. They also resulted in tens of thousands of serious injuries.

Top Reasons for SUV Rollovers

SUV's have a high center of gravity
SUV's have a narrow trackwidth
SUV's are advertised to carry too much weight
SUV's do not have roll protection, roll bars or roll cages
SUV's often have faulty seat belt protection
SUV's sometimes have bad door latches and lack of window glazing, leading to ejections
SUV's have seat back failures allowing occupants to come out of seatbelts
SUV's have a lack of rollover warnings
SUV's have insufficient roof support for rollovers, causing injury and death from roof crush, roof failure, roof header collapse and/or roof rail pillar collapse

Roof crush injuries are caused by the energy of the vehicle in a roll creating compressive forces pushing down on the top of skull when the head is in an upright position. The compression causes a bursting fracture in the C5 to C7 of the cervical spine. This bursting fracture causes a loss of intravertebral space both anterior and posterior.

In other rollovers, the roof intruding is not the cause of injury, but it is when the occupant "drives" into the roof, resulting in the head flexing forward before receiving an impact to the top of the head. This causes the bone in cervical vertebrae to fracture, NOT BURST. The posterior corner of the vertebrae then impinges directly against the spinal cord resulting in loss of anterior vertebrae body height.

Diving type injuries can happen to belted occupants, who for many reasons become unbelted or unrestrained during a rollover. This can happen by inertia release of the buckle, false latching of the buckle, came-out, or unintentional or inadvertent release. Many times persons in serious accidents are later convinced by law enforcement or others that prior to the rollover, that they were properly restrained. However, in all roof crushes cases, a biomedical-engineer or biomechanical expert must be hired to study the medical records, physical injuries and the vehicle in which the injured person was an occupant. Only after a thorough inspection, can the tail prints of the injury be determined.

With the growing numbers of sport utility vehicles (SUVs) on the roads, so is the number of rollovers increasing as well. Rollovers are not of course confined to SUVs, as small subcompacts also have a high rollover rate as well. In fact small cars are four (4) times as likely to be involved with a rollover and roof crush as a full-sized luxury cars. The smaller the vehicles, usually the less deformation of the roof during a rollover. In fact, larger American vehicles and especially pick-up trucks can not withstand a rollover without serious roof crush. According to Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) 216, a roof pillar a passenger car must deform no more than five (5) inches when subjected to a force of 1 1/2 times the vehicle's weight, or 5,000 lbs. whichever is less. Pickup truck (light trucks) are not even required to meet the minimal requirement of FMVSS 216. For example, the roof pillars of a 6,000 lb. pickup truck, would need to withstand only 5/6 of the vehicles own weight in order to pass FMV's 216, even though the trucks roof often crushes under its own weight. This "standard" only applies to the front roof supports/pillars not the center or rears ones (if any).

Roofs crush as a result of an energy assault or over compression of the roof supports. This is caused when the vehicle is inverted and begins its downward path of the vehicle and its center of gravity into the roadway or the ground. At that moment the roof pillars start to crush under this energy assault to its structure.

To the untrained observer, roof pillars of most vehicles appear solid and sturdy, especially strong enough to withstand a roof crush in a rollover. The surprises come through when one looks at a cross-section of the pillar. Most are nothing more than folded/molded corrugated sheet metal, being hollow inside. Therefore, when impact occurs the metal folds over into the empty inner space allowing more folding or crushing to continue. Studies show that if the inner part of the pillars are either filled with a high density foam or honey combed structure, then roof crush is at a minimal, thus saving lives!!

Most automotive engineers agree injuries are reduced dramatically if the occupants stay inside the rolling vehicle. In fact, one has a five times greater chance of being killed or seriously injured if thrown from the vehicle. To accomplish this, door latches must be engineered to remain belted and window shields must be in tact, all to help retain the occupant.

In the late 1960's a Ford engineer suggested that Ford make stronger roofs to prevent injuries, especially since the installation of shoulder harnesses was becoming mandatory. With its implementation, more occupants would remain in an upright position during a rollover, subjecting them to more head injury due to the inability the occupant to bend as the roof collapses on to them.

Another noted engineer, Don Huelke, used by many of the automakers in their defense of roof crush cases, stated that (severity of all injuries increases with roof crush). The amount of roof crush is directly attributed to the severity of the non-ejected occupant's injuries to occupants in 266 accidents, in which the injuries ranged from just minor cuts to quadriplegia and death.

The Essentials to Winning a Rollover- Roof Crush Case:

1) Vehicle and accident site inspection as soon after the accident as possible.
2) Preservation of the vehicle in its condition after the accident.
3) Having an experienced accident investigator to take accurate and complete statements of all occupants, law enforcers, EMS personal and witnesses.
4) Having an Accident Reconstruction Engineer to determine how the accident occurred.
5) Having Biomedical or Biomechanical experts to determine what part of the accident or vehicle caused the plaintiffs injuries.
6) Interview the plaintiffs treating medical physicians.
7) In catastrophic injuries, the resulting in paraplegia. quadriplegia, or serious head injuries, hiring a life care plan consultant to evaluate the cost of medical care to the seriously injured plaintiff and estimate ALL medical and life care needs over this persons lifetime.

FORD SUV ROLLOVER INFORMATION

When Ford first introduced the Ford Explorer was it soon became a marketing dream ? the perfect vehicle for a baby-boom generation that wanted it all. You could use it as your family car, and it had the rugged, adventurous image of a truck. The problem however was, it was still a big, tall truck & it rolled over more easily than a passenger car would.
FORD EXPLORER DESIGN PROBLEM
The roots of that problem lie in Ford's original design decision to build the new sport utility on the skeleton (frame) of a pickup truck instead of all in one piece, like a car. Ford was under pressure to compete with General
The 1991 memo estimated the increased costs of the '95 redesign at $1,267 per vehicle, despite cost-reduction programs. According to another document, one of the economies involved using thinner metal panels to construct the Explorer's roof. Experts say most vehicle roofs are extremely weak, thanks to a federal roof crush standard that has not been changed for three decades, and was widely regarded as ineffective at the time it was adopted. Safety advocates say the issue is important because a major cause of deaths and paralyzing injuries in rollover crashes is the roof collapsing onto occupants.
FORD EXPLORER ROOF FAILURE & COLLAPSE
However, the Ford memo did not make clear whether the plan to thin the roof of the '95 Explorer would weaken it. The document signaled an intent to reduce the "gage," or thickness, of the roof panels "and go to baked hardenable"--a reference to using heat to temper the steel. Harmon refused to discuss whether the strength of the roof had been lowered. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration published stability indexes for a wide range of passenger cars and SUVs and other light trucks. According to the list, the original four-door model of the Explorer had a stability index of 1.08, while the index for '95 and later models dropped to 1.06. Since the width of the vehicle had not changed, the decline meant the center of gravity rose slightly, Ford acknowledged.
But this is "a razor's distinction," said Harmon. Ford and other auto makers also maintain that the index is misleading because it does not take account of individual vehicle design features that could increase or decrease rollover risk. "You can't make any kind of correlation between a change that small [between the original and '95 Explorers] and any real-world performance," he said. While lowering a vehicle's center of gravity is one way to increase stability, so is widening its track. Internal memos in 1987 and 1989 show that Ford engineers had suggested widening the stance of the Explorer, but the step was not taken. More than a decade later, however, the company is heeding their own advice. Ford's 2002 Explorer is approximately 2.5 inches wider than the previous models.
FORD EXPLORER REDESIGNED FOR 2002 (BUT ARE THEY ANY SAFER..?)
The redesigned 2002 Explorer has larger tires with a higher recommended pressure than before. The new 2002 Explorer is two and a half inches wider ? the option discarded in 1989 as too expensive and time-consuming. The stiff steel rails of a pickup-truck underbody remain, but Ford lowered them considerably when it exchanged the Explorer's primitive suspension for a sophisticated car- like one, a change that also improved the braking to car quality. And the new underbody can no longer be built on the same assembly line as a Ranger. Only time will tell if Ford has finally solved the rollover problem.
BRONCO INFO
FORD BRONCO II or BRONCO 2 ROLLOVER ACCIDENTS
(a/k/a Ford Bronco ll, Bronco ii, & Bronco2 Rollovers)
Rollovers, Roof Crush, Roof Failures,Suspension Problems, Tire Failures, Stability Problem & NHTSA Recall History
HISTORY OF THE BRONCO II ROLLOVER PROBLEM
As a result of the gasoline shortages of the late-1970s,

The popular television program ?60 Minutes? aired a segment which described the danger of Jeep rollovers in late 1980 of which Ford was aware, yet it continued to use the CJ- 7 as its developmental model. According to some experts in the field, the tendency to roll over is caused by a low static stability index ("SI"). The SI describes the relationship between a vehicle's track width and the height of the vehicle's center of gravity. The lower the SI, the higher the risk of rolling over. A vehicle with a narrow track and a high center of gravity is more likely to roll.
FORD BRONCO ROLLOVER INDEX

In February 1981, Ford engineers offered management five proposals to make the Bronco II more stable. Proposals One and Two involved slight increases in the Bronco II's stability index to 2.02 and 2.03. Proposals Three, Four and Five involved additional widening of the track and lowering of the center of gravity. These changes would result in SIs of 2.09, 2.19, and 2.25, respectively. Proposals One and Two could be completed by the production deadline date for the Bronco II; but Proposals Three, Four, and Five "[could] not be contained within Job #1, 1983 P/U 4x4 timing? because they involved increasing ride height, widening the track, and/or making body revisions. As a result Ford chose to proceed with Proposal Two knowing that the Bronco II would have a stability index of 2.03, worse than that of the CJ-7 at 2.04.
In addition to an automobile's stability index, its tendency to roll over is governed by the amount of understeer or oversteer and its sensitivity to steering inputs. Ford added a front stabilizer bar to the Bronco in order to increase the Bronco II's roll stiffness, hoping to increase the amount of its understeer. When equipped with a front stabilizer bar the Bronco II was an understeer vehicle, but when it approached its cornering limit, the Bronco II became an oversteer vehicle. After adding a front stabilizer bar, Ford performed only subjective tests to evaluate the bar, without performing objective tests such as limit maneuvers or lane change testing.
FORD BRONCO II - TWIN I-BEAM SUSPENSION
Another factor affecting the Bronco II's stability was Ford's use of the twin I-beam (swing-axle) suspension. Swing axles have a tendency to ?jack? because lateral forces on the tire tend to push the axle up. Jacking has two effects: (1) the tires will move inward under the vehicle, causing the vehicle to become narrower, and (2) the front of the vehicle moves up, making the vehicle taller. As a result, stability decreases instantaneously. Jacking causes the Bronco II to jump up or ?spike,? when the vehicle experiences lateral forces of about. Ford knew about the jacking problem associated with the twin I-beam suspension. The engineering department published a paper as early as 1965 warning that in smaller vehicles twin I-beams created jacking during
Ford did have safer choices, and its own engineers recommended the use of a MacPherson strut which lowers the center of gravity. However, the executive in charge of making the suspension decision elected to go with the twin I-beam as a result of pressures from his superiors. Ford also sought additional marketing advantages available with the twin I-beam.
After the decision to go with Proposal Two had been made, Ford built a mechanical prototype of the Bronco II using the Jeep CJ-7 as its image vehicle and making the Proposal Two modifications. Ford then scheduled extensive testing of the mechanical prototype. As a result of the testing, Ford engineers reported that the Bronco II's track needed to be widened or its ride height lowered.
After the mechanical prototype testing, Ford built engineering prototypes. Initially, the prototypes were tested with the vehicle performing J-turns of up to 55 m.p.h. and 360 degrees of steer.The vehicle would tip over at speeds as low as 30 m.p.h. Id. Ford's engineers tried a combination of different suspensions, tires, and steering designs in an attempt to stabilize the Bronco II. Id. By mid-March 1982, development engineers again reported that to improve the problem of rollovers, the track width had to be increased by three to four inches.
In April 1982, Ford scheduled a meeting to review a track-widening proposal and to ?develop a contingency plan which will not delay Job # 1.? The engineers concluded that a 2-inch increase in track width was the minimum required for a minor improvement in stability.A significant improvement in J-turn handling could be achieved on a Bronco II by using 14-inch wheels or increasing track-width 3 to 4 inches. Neither of these recommendations was ever implemented. Even modest increases of two inches were rejected by Ford because ?even with 110% effort, Job #1 would be in serious jeopardy.? Eight months from the commencement of Job #1, the engineers once again recommended increasing the track by two inches which would have delayed Job #1 by three months. These recommendations were necessitated by the results of a test conducted on track during May 1982 at the Arizona Proving Grounds. The test drivers experienced the prototypes tipping up onto two wheels, outriggers failing, and vehicles pole-vaulting over. In fact live J-turn testing was halted because it was too dangerous for the engineers and test drivers. Ford did not resume live J-turn testing until May 1989, six years after production of the Bronco II had commenced. Ford implemented several superficial changes in order to increase the Bronco II's stability, including adding weight below the center of gravity, adding sealant to the tires, and changing the wheels. Ford did not make any major changes because they required widening the track or removing the twin I-beam.Both of which were costly and would have delayed production.
FORD BRONCO II TESTING AT PROVING GROUNDS

On May 28, 1982, at or around the time of the Arizona Proving Grounds testing, Ford collected all documents relating to Bronco II's handling characteristics. This was the first time in Ford history that it had gathered engineering documents relating to any particular vehicle prior to production. All documents were maintained in a single location - Ford's Office of General Counsel. These documents were reviewed by Ford employees with the intent to close the loop of vehicle documentation in this case. One hundred thirteen documents were specifically related to the Bronco II program reports, test requests, test plans, and simulation analysis. Fifty-three of the documents disappeared. One of those documents, an "assessment update" issued two months before the production deadline, contained a separate document identified as "attachment two." The attachment listed seven major risks due to incomplete testing of the Bronco II. The attachment was never found nor made available to the Ammermans. On November 24, 1982, Ford approved the Bronco II, certifying it was ready for production. The Bronco IIs placed on the market did not have the recommended increased track-width of at least 2 inches or a lower center of gravity.
FORD BRONCO II STABILITY QUESTIONED

After the advent of production Ford engineers continued to raise questions concerning Bronco II's stability. In September 1986 Ford considered but disregarded larger tires because they would decrease the SI and "raise questions with . . . OGC [Office of General Counsel]." . Another Ford engineer recommended consideration of more permanent methods of improving the Bronco's stability, including lowering the vehicle's center of gravity, adding more weight, and widening the track width. The engineers were essentially ignored.
By placing the Bronco II on the market, Ford failed to meet its own design criteria. Ford's design goals for the Bronco II were the following:
1. Extremely safe;
2. Reduce rollover propensity to minimum including panic situations;
3. Avoid (virtually preclude) over correction in accident avoidance maneuvers;
4. Remain stable at all speeds under maximum steering inputs per human factors analysis;
5. Respond safely to large steering inputs which are typical of accident avoidance or emergency maneuvers; and
6. Handling and stability equal or better than any vehicle in class.
The vast majority of vehicles will not roll over or tip-up during J-turns and emergency avoidance maneuvers.
FORD BRONCO II CENTER OF ATTENTION WITH NHTSA
Although the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration (?NHTSA?) has never promulgated rollover resistance standards, it has investigated defects which contribute to a propensity for rollover. The NHTSA conducted a defect investigation of the Bronco II from late 1988 until October 1990.
In September 1988 NHTSA requested information from Ford concerning the Bronco II. Ford acknowledges that it was supposed to provide information that answered questions posed by NHTSA but indicated it ?didn't notice that [NHTSA] delineated development testing.?
The NHTSA requested that Ford:
[f]urnish the number and copies of all owner reports, . . . investigations, memoranda,and other records from all sources either received or authorized by Ford, or which Ford is otherwise aware, pertaining to:
(a) rollover, stability or similar performance or
(b) the subject alleged defects of the Bronco II . . .
(c) any information Ford may have comparing the Bronco II's stability factor (center of gravity height) with other motor vehicles.

Identify the parties involved and describe any and all tests and analyses at (1) Ford, . . . or subject alleged defects, or (b) used to establish the stability of the Bronco II. . . . Furnish copies of all reports, notes, tables, graphs, film, photographs, or similar documentation which were developed for each.

Furnish a copy of all documents not specifically requested which Ford believes are pertinent to the alleged defects and the resolution of the alleged defects, or were used in formulating its assessment of the alleged defects.

Ford asserted that it believed the Spring 1982 APG testing did not have to be submitted to the NHTSA. Robert Munson, Ford's representative responsible for responding to the NHTSA and Jeffrey Miller, then NHTSA chief counsel and current lobbyist for the automobile industry, confirmed that Ford sent the NHTSA production testing but did not submit the APG live limits testing. The NHTSA neither conducted tests of its own nor questioned Ford about the documents produced. After considering Ford's response alone, the NHTSA issued a closing report on October 31, 1990, stating there appears no reasonable expectation that further investigation would lead to a determination of the existence of a safety-related defect with respect to any of the allegations regarding the propensity of the Bronco II to rollover.
After the Bronco II was put on the market, Ernest Grush, Ford's automotive safety office statistician, acknowledged that he met with representatives of Consumer Union (?CU?) in April 1989 to discuss Bronco II accident data. CU was contemplating publishing a report about the Bronco II's instability. A day after this meeting, Jerry Sloan, another Ford representative, authored a memorandum reporting on the meeting, stating that Ford visited with CU to ?moderat[e] what might otherwise be a totally disastrous story.?. Sloan's memorandum reported that Ford had ?clouded their [Consumer Union's] minds, loosened some conclusions, . . . and sent them off to search for additional information which may work to our advantage.?
FORD RANGER
Ford Ranger Pickup Truck Rollover Problem

Using the Jeep CJ as a model, Ford introduced its first SUV, the Bronco II, which rolled out in March 1983. It was an immediate hit. Throughout the 1980s, the company sold over 700,000 Bronco IIs -- double its initial projections. Almost immediately, however, the Bronco II began to have rollover problems. By 1989, the Bronco II had become an easy target of safety advocates and trial lawyers, who approached NHTSA for a recall of the vehicle. According to federal crash statistics, the Bronco II was one of the three most deadly SUVs then on the road, and the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety had rated it the most deadly.
NHTSA RECALL DUE TO ROLLOVER STABILITY PROBLEM SOUGHT
In October 1990, NHTSA rejected the petition to recall the Ford Bronco ll. NHTSA launched a formal investigation of the Bronco II to determine whether or not it should be recalled. According to the agency, in order to find a safety-related defect in the Ford Bronco 2 that was causing the rollovers. The data needed must show that the vehicle's safety-related performance distinguished itself from the rest of its class (in this case, SUVs). In other words, NHTSA found that the Bronco II may have been dangerous, but it wasn't dangerous enough when compared to other SUVs. The decision remains controversial.
JEEP ROLLOVERS CONTINUED
As Jeep continued to play a major role in the SUV market, the rollovers of Jeep Vehicles continued as well.../feedback/feedback.cfm

As more and more young and unsuspecting drivers get behind the wheel of Geo Trackers and Sidekicks, the more rollover accidents with devastating injuries from ejections and roof crush or roof pillar collapse will occur. The higher rollover propensity of these SUVs is the simple fact that they have a high center of gravity. This is directly based on it's short wheel base and track width. When you put 4 people in a Sidekick or Geo Tracker, the the maximum load capacity of these SUVs are pushed to the limit. When this happens the center of gravity is raised, as is the chances of a rollover of the Sidekick or Tracker. When a rollover occurs, the roof often will collapse or crush into the occupant zone causing serious head and spinal cord injuies.
SUZUKI INFO

Suzuki Rollover Accidents & Roof Crush Injuries:
Suzuki Samurai & Sidekick & Geo Tracker Rollovers
Suzuki Samurai Rollover History

The Suzuki Samurai was first marketed in the U.S. in 1986 and was sold as a four-wheel drive light utility/sport vehicle in either a convertible or a hardtop body style. The Samurai was marketed exclusively in the continental U.S. by Suzuki of America Automotive Corporation and in Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Island by Suzuki Motor Company, Ltd. The SJ410 was sold by Suzuki Motor Company in its marketing territory from April 1981 to the present as a four-wheel drive in a convertible, hardtop or truck configuration. The LJ80 four wheel drive vehiclehttp://www.dykesautoparts.com/repairable/repairimage/stk9587.jpg

As more and more young and unsuspecting drivers get behind the wheel of Geo Trackers and Sidekicks, the more rollover accidents with devastating injuries from ejections and roof crush or roof pillar collapse will occur. The higher rollover propensity of these SUVs is the simple fact that they have a high center of gravity. This is directly based on it's short wheel base and track width. When you put 4 people in a Sidekick or Geo Tracker, the the maximum load capacity of these SUVs are pushed to the limit. When this happens the center of gravity is raised, as is the chances of a rollover of the Sidekick or Tracker. When a rollover occurs, the roof often will collapse or crush into the occupant zone causing serious head and spinal cord injuies.
Suzuki Samurai Rollover Concerns

When Suzuki unveiled the Samurai, safety experts were shocked that Suzuki would have introduced a vehicle with the same rollover tendencies as the AMC Jeep CV-5 and CJ-7. American Suzuki Motor Corporation however, defends the attacks, charging that the testing procedures used by Consumer Reports and others were biased and completely inaccurate and in fact called such statements concerning the Samurai's high propensity to rollover as defamatory and Suzuki claimed that the rollover tests used were altered to cause the Samurai to rollover. Consumer Reports responded that there were no alterations in the test, as it is the same test as used to test Samurai's competitors.

Suzuki Samurai Rollover Propensity - Recall Proposed

The Samurai was marketed and sold as a vehicle not for off road use, but instead for highway use. In fact the advertisement on the car buying public was showed the Samurai as a great vehicle for highway trips and commuting to work. The problem however was the vehicle has a high center of gravity and unstable driving characteristics making it not fit or suitable for day to day commuting. The high ground clearance, short wheelbase, narrow track and stiff suspension makes the Samurai somewhat tricky to handle and can behave abnormally in normal accident avoidance maneuvers.
Soon after the first Samurai's started to rollover and cause injuries and deaths, consumer groups demanded the recall of the Suzuki Samurai. The recall debate started after the vehicle was given the "not acceptable" ruling by Consumer Reports. A recall unfortunately can not make and fix the problem is inherent in its design, "The only way to fix it is to make the vehicle longer, wider and heavier." The Center for Auto Safety petitioned the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to recall the Suzuki Samurai because of safety problems. However, NHTSA on September 1, 1988, denied the request by the Center for Auto Safety to recall the Suzuki Samurai. The Agency agreed to establish a rollover standard for cars and light trucks. Suzuki's continued to sell and market the 1989 model year, with sales as low as 2,000 per month compared to 10,000-12,000 per month a year earlier.
Suzuki Samurai - Office of Defects Investigations

In August 1988, the Office of Defects Investigation with the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) reported a review-of the 113 report Suzuki vehicle rollovers indicated the following:

1) All fatal first event Samurai rollovers involved ejection
2) The average time to failure/time of ownership was less than 8 months, ranging from 2 to 15 months
3) The driver was cited by police in approximately 50 percent of police reported rollovers
4) Alcohol was involved in 50 percent of rollovers described in police reports
5) Where the age of the driver was known, 73 percent of the reported drivers were 25 years old or younger, The oldest driver involved in a single vehicle rollover was 43 years old
6) Limited visibility due to darkness occurred in at least 58 percent of the rollovers
7) There is no seasonal influence (winter, spring, summer, or fall)
8) The average reported travel speed was 37 mph, ranging from 10 to 65 mph.
9) The average reported mileage was 13,090 miles, ranging from 1,618 to 34,000 miles
10) Female drivers accounted for 44 percent of the reported rollovers
11) Weekend rollovers accounted for 44 percent of the reports
12) California accounted for more than twice the number of rollovers as any other state (20 percent versus Florida's 9 percent)
13) A wet or icy roadway or excessively windy road conditions occurred in approximately 29 percent of the rollover

It was also determined that when a rollover occurred, the rollover was reportedly preceded by:
1. Loss of control (i.e., spun) - 25 percent
2. Left roadway, straight road - 18 percent
3. Left roadway, cornering/turning - 20 percent
4. Obstacle avoidance maneuver - 15 percent
5. Ramped (struck obstacle) - 8 percent

Suzuki Sidekick & Geo Tracker Roll In
Due to declining sales and threats of continued litigation, Suzuki in 1989 phased out the Samurai and introduced in 1989, the Suzuki Sidekick. Though the Samurai and Sidekick look very similar the Sidekick is 4 inches wider and 200 lbs. heavier than the Samurai is. Built in the new joint Suzuki/GM Error! Hyperlink reference not valid. factory in Canada, they were briefly powered by the Samurai's 1.3-liter engine, but were soon equipped with a stroked version of that engine, displacing 1590cc and producing 80 horsepower with 8 valves and throttle body fuel injection. The Sidekick's "Identical Twin" the Geo Tracker was sold and marketed through General Motor's dealers in the U.S. The problem with rollover propensity though was not resolved, as the Sidekick and the Geo Tracker, still are tall, lightweight narrow utility vehicles that due to this combination will not escape rollover accidents, but is a vast improvement to the more unstable Suzuki Samurai.
Also sold as the Suzuki Escudo in Asia, the Suzuki Vitara in Europe and Australia, the Suzuki Sidekick, Chevrolet, Geo, and GM Tracker in North America, and the Asuna Sunrunner in the South Pacific and Canada, the new Suzuki proved to be another very popular vehicle. A little larger than the Samurai, it made use of independent front suspension, coil-sprung rear suspension, an available automatic transmission, and a much nicer interior. In 1991, Suzuki introduced the long-wheelbase, 5-door hardtop version of the Sidekick, expanding the model lineup into even more upscale territory. In 1995 Suzuki introducted for the decidedly more upscale and the sporty Sidekick Sport. Available in the U.S. with an 1.8-liter, 120 horsepower DOHC inline-4 engine with wide 16-inch wheels. But Europe, Asia, and Australia were given an even better version, dubbed the Vitara LWB V6. Its 2.0-liter 24-valve 4-cam V-6 was Suzuki's largest and most powerful engine yet, producing a smooth 134 hp and a broad torque curve. In 1998 Suzuki unveiled convertible and hardtop Vitara and Chevrolet Tracker, and the Grand Vitara.
Suzuki Sidekick & Geo Tracker Rollover Accidents & Roof Crush Injuries
http://www.rolloverlawyer.com/Firestone/firestone.htm